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Conceptual Graphs and First-Order Logic
Michel Wermelinger
Departamento de Informatica, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
2825 Monte da Caparica, Portugal
E-mail: mw@fct.unl.pt
Abstract. Conceptual Structures (CS) Theory is a logic-based knowl-
edge representation formalism. To show that conceptual graphs have the
power of rst-order logic, it is necessary to have a mapping between both
formalisms. A proof system, i.e. axioms and inference rules, for concep-
tual graphs is also useful. It must be sound (no false statement is derived
from a true one) and complete (all possible tautologies can be derived
from the axioms). This paper shows that Sowa's original denition of
the mapping is incomplete, incorrect, inconsistent, and unintuitive, and
the proof system is incomplete too. To overcome these problems a new
translation algorithm is given and a complete proof system is presented.
Furthermore, the framework is extended for higher-order types.
Key phrases: logical foundations of Conceptual Structures;  operator;
inference rules; logical axioms; higher-order types; meta-level reasoning.
1 Introduction
The logical foundation of CS Theory, as presented in [Sowa, 1984], is based on the
denition of the  operator, which translates conceptual graphs into rst-order
formulas, and on the denition of rules of inference. On page 142 it is claimed that
\any formula in rst-order logic can be expressed with simply nested contexts
and lines of identity", and Theorem 4.4.7 on page 173 states that the inference
rules for conceptual graphs are complete. However, as will be shown, the formal
denition of  doesn't fulll the claim and the theorem|which is not proven|is
false. Moreover, Sowa has been advocating the use of meta-level graphs. To that
end, higher-order types are needed, although they are just as useful to specify
ner-grained ontologies.
The purpose of the work to be described in this paper is therefore twofold: on
one hand to correct the original denitions, on the other hand to extend them in
order to accomodate higher-order types, thus providing a rst step towards meta-
level reasoning with conceptual graphs. The full reformulation and extension
of the (rst-order) logical foundations of conceptual graphs is made up of the
following steps:
1. Dene a rst-order language L and an interpretation for it.
2. Dene an algorithm to translate conceptual graphs into formulas of L.
3. Dene inference rules and logical axioms for conceptual graphs.
4. Prove that they form a sound and complete proof system for rst-order logic.
Due to space limitations, steps 1 and 4 have been omitted
1
. They can be found
in [Wermelinger, 1995] which also includes the higher-order type framework to
be used by  and the inference rules. That framework is a simplied and yet
more expressive formulation of the formal proposal for incorporating higher-
order types into CS Theory presented in [Wermelinger and Lopes, 1994].
The structure of the paper is straightforward. The next section presents an
overview of the adopted higher-order type system, and the other two main sec-
tions deal with the  operator and the inference rules, respectively. The reader is
expected to have some knowledge of conceptual graphs and logic. Most examples
are adapted from [Sowa, 1984; Sowa, 1992].
2 Higher-Order Types
The building units of conceptual graphs are types. There is a concept type
hierarchy T
C
and a relation type hierarchy T
R
. Both of them are lattices. The
top element of T
C
is the universal concept type >
c
, and the bottom element is
the absurd concept type ?
c
. Similarly, the universal relation type >
r
and the
absurd relation type ?
r
are the top and bottom elements of T
R
. Concept types
are classied according to their kind and order, and relation types are classied
according to their arity and order.
There are two kinds of concept types: relational and non-relational ones. The
former denote relations, the latter do not. The set of all relational concept types
is written T
rc
, and T
nc
represents all non-relational ones. Concept types can also
be classied according to their order: T
rc
i
is the set of ith-order relational concept
types, and the symbol T
nc
i
stands for the set of all ith-order non-relational
concept types. Both >
c
and ?
c
can be of any kind and order. Therefore, they
stand apart from the other concept types and aren't included in T
rc
or T
nc
. As
for relation types, each has an associated arity and order. The set of all n-ary
relation types is written as T
r
hni
and the set of all ith-order relation types is
represented by T
r
i
. Again, >
r
and ?
r
do not belong to any of those sets.
Example 1. Following are some types and their classication according to the
above scheme:
{ CAT; FELINE; ANIMAL; SQUARE; RECTANGLE; RHOMBUS 2 T
nc
1
;
{ SPECIES; GENUS; SHAPE 2 T
nc
2
;
{ CATEGORY; CHARACTERISTIC2 T
nc
3
;
{ AGNT; OBJ; LOC 2 T
r
h2i
\ T
r
1
;
{ BETW 2 T
r
h3i
\ T
r
1
;
{ INVERSE-OF is a relation between two rst-order order relations, hence it is
an element of T
r
h2i
\ T
r
2
;
{ RELATION, BINARY, TRANSITIVE, REFLEXIVE, ANTI-SYM, SYMMETRIC,
PARTIAL-ORDER 2 T
rc
2
because there is a second-order relation type.
1
The completeness proof consists mainly in showing how the axioms and inference
rules given in [Hamilton, 1988] can be translated to conceptual graphs.
Simply put, a higher-order type denotes a set of lower-order types, and if t
1
is
a subtype of t
2
then the denotation of t
1
must be a subset of t
2
's denotation. More
specically, relational concept types denote relation types, non-relational concept
types denote other non-relational concept types, and relation types denote tuples
of concept types
2
. Therefore, if t
1
is a subtype of t
2
then both must be of the same
kind. Furthermore, if t
1
and t
2
are relation types they must have the same arity.
That way relation nodes can be generalized or specialized without removing or
adding concept nodes to the graph.
Example 2. The only subtype relationships (represented by <) among the types
of the previous example are:
{ CAT < FELINE < ANIMAL;
{ SQUARE is the maximal common subtype of RECTANGLE and RHOMBUS;
{ PARTIAL-ORDER is the maximal common subtype of TRANSITIVE, REFLEXIVE,
and ANTI-SYM which in turn are subtypes of BINARY;
{ SYMMETRIC < BINARY < RELATION.
A concept t : m indicates that m is an entity of type t. In other words, m is
an element of the denotation of t. Therefore, if t is a relational concept type then
m must be a relation type. Otherwise, i.e. if t is a non-relational concept type,
then so is m. To sum up, relation types and non-relational concept types can be
used as markers, too. However, as rst-order non-relational concept types denote
individuals (and not types), a new set T
nc
0
of \zero-order types" is needed. The
elements of T
nc
0
are mutually incomparable since they represent individuals. All
other markers are organized into (disjoint) lattices since they are types. The
marker set M is therefore a partially ordered set. If we add the generic marker *
as a top element and the absurd marker

* as a bottom element, thenM becomes
a lattice too, like T
C
and T
R
.
Example 3. The following concepts show the denotation relationships between
the types of Example 1. When a type is used as a marker, it is written in lower
case and prexed with #.
{ CAT: #Garfield where #Garfield 2 T
nc
0
;
{ SPECIES: #cat and GENUS: #feline ;
{ SHAPE: #square SHAPE: #rectangle SHAPE: #rhombus ;
{ CATEGORY: #species CATEGORY: #genus CHARACTERISTIC: #shape ;
{ SYMMETRIC: #inverse-of which implies BINARY: #inverse-of and
RELATION: #inverse-of ;
{ BINARY: #agnt BINARY: #obj BINARY: #loc .
2
The arguments of a rst-order relation are non-relational types, and a higher-order
relation has as arguments lower-order relations. But as conceptual graphs are bipar-
tite, those arguments must be represented by concepts. Hence the need for relational
concept types.
3 Translation
To show the logical foundations of conceptual graphs, the rst step consists
in nding a correspondence, i.e. a translation algorithm, between graphs and
closed formulas
3
of some rst-order language. The latter is implicitly dened
by the transformation process. In CS Theory, the translation is given by the 
operator. Let us recall its denition as given in [Sowa, 1984].
Assumption3.3.2. The operator  maps conceptual graphs into formulas in
the rst-order predicate calculus. If u is any conceptual graph, then u is a
formula determined by the following construction:
{ If u contains k generic concepts, assign a distinct variable symbol x
1
; : : : ; x
k
to each one.
{ For each concept c of u, let identier (c) be the variable assigned to c if c is
generic or referent(c) if c is individual.
{ Represent each concept c as a monadic predicate whose name is the same as
type(c) and whose argument is identier(c).
{ Represent each n-adic conceptual relation r of u as an n-adic predicate whose
name is the same as type(r). For each i from 1 to n, let the ith argument of
the predicate be the identier of the concept linked to the ith arc of r.
{ Then u has a quantier prex 9x
1
: : :9x
k
and a body consisting of the
conjunction of all the predicates for the concepts and conceptual relations
of u.
Assumption4.2.3. If p is a proposition asserting the graphs u
1
; : : : ; u
n
, then
p is the formula (u
1
^ : : :^u
n
). If c is a negative context consisting of (NEG)
linked to a proposition p, then c is :p. All generic concepts that occur in p
or any context nested in p must be assigned distinct variable symbols by the
formula operator .
Assumption4.2.6. If u is a conceptual graph containing one or more lines of
identity, compute the formula u by rst transforming the graph u according to
the following algorithm:
assign a unique variable name to every generic concept of u;
for a in the set of dominant concepts of u loop
x := identier(a);
append "=x" to the referent field of every
concept dominated by a;
end loop;
erase all coreference links in u;
The formula u is the result of applying  to the transformed version of u
with the following rule for mapping concepts with multiple referents: if b is a
concept of u of the form [t : x
1
= x
2
= : : : = x
n
], then b has the form
t(x
1
) ^ x
1
= x
2
^ : : :^ x
1
= x
n
.
3
A formula with free variables can be regarded as equivalent to its universal closure.
Although these denitions seem trivial, there are several things to notice
about them. In the rst place, the universal type > (using Sowa's notation) and
the absurd type ? aren't handled in any special way. Furthermore, a negation
sign can never appear immediately before a predicate; there must be always an
existential quantier between them. Notice also that each context corresponds
to a closed formula except for one case. If a concept c
1
in context p
1
is dominated
by a generic concept c
2
which is in p
2
6= p
1
, then the variable corresponding to
c
2
appears free in the translation of p
1
, but it is bounded in the formula (p
2
).
Having these particularities in mind, consider the formula 8x P(x) where
P is any unary predicate. Since  only uses the existential quantier, the for-
mula must be rewritten as :9x :P(x). Because of the negated literal, further
transformation is necessary in order to get :9x :9y P(y) ^ y = x which can be
represented by the incomplete graph :[ :[ [P: *y=*x] ] ] or, in graphical
notation,
:
  
:
   P . But what concept should be linked to the loose end of
the coreference link? Sowa's answer is
Denition4.2.8. If t is a type label for some concept, the negated type :t is
dened by a type denition of the form type :t(x) is [T: *x] :[[t: *x]].
Therefore, :9x :P(x) should be written as
:
:P which gets expanded into
:
>   
:
   P . But if we apply the formal denition of  to that graph we
obtain :(9x T (x)^:(9y P(y) ^ y = x)) which is only equivalent to the original
formula if T (x) is true for any x.
To sum up, the formal denition of the  operator is inconsistent, incom-
plete, and not intuitive. The fundamental reason is just one: the translation
process doesn't reect the usual interpretation of > as `true' and ? as `false'.
But negated types convey that special meaning of the universal type. There-
fore, Assumption 3.3.2, besides not being intuitive, is not consistent with Def-
inition 4.2.8. Furthermore, that interpretation of > is absolutely necessary for
conceptual graphs to be able to represent any closed rst-order formula, hence
the incompleteness of .
Adding to the problems mentioned above, the denition of  is not totally
correct. On one hand, the empty context gets translated simply into () which
is not a well-formed rst-order formula because there is no predicate. On the
other hand, Assumption 4.2.3 doesn't impose any ordering for the translation of
graphs in the same context. That might lead to a formula dierent from the in-
tended one, if there are coreference links. Consider the graph
:
CAT       DOG
which is supposed to state \there is a dog which is not a cat". Applying As-
sumption 4.2.6, one gets :[CAT: *y=*x] [DOG:*x]which can be translated into
:(9y Cat(y)^ y = x)^9x Dog(x) or 9x Dog(x)^:(9y Cat(y)^ y = x) depend-
ing on the chosen order. The formulas are not logically equivalent because x is
free in the rst formula. Thus, only the second one corresponds to the intuitive
meaning of the graph.
The new translation algorithm given by the ten rules of Denition 1 over-
comes all these problems and it also handles higher-order types. However, the
basic mechanism remains the same as in Sowa's approach: each concept is as-
signed a unique variable (rule 2) which is existentially quantied (rule 5); those
variables are copied from the dominating to the dominated concepts (rules 4 and
6); the formula corresponding to a graph consists of an existential quantier pre-
x followed by the conjunction of the predicates generated by the concepts and
relations (rule 8); and negative contexts translate into negated formulas (rule
10).
Let us rst see how the above mentioned problems are dealt with. In order
to be able to represent any closed rst-order formula, the universal type must be
translated into a true predicate which simultaneously introduces a new variable.
The equality predicate is an obvious candidate. For clarity, it will be written as
an inx operator. Furthermore, the symbol
:
= was chosen to avoid any confu-
sion with the meta-level equality = used in denitions. Therefore, >
c
will be
translated as x
:
= x (rule 6) where x is the variable associated to the concept.
Concepts with the absurd type or the absurd marker are always false and cor-
respond thus to the formula :x
:
= x
4
(rule 6). Similarly for the universal and
absurd relation types (rule 7). Handling empty contexts, the second problem, is
just as easy. According to [Sowa, 1984, p. 151], \an empty set of graphs makes
no assertion whatever. By convention, it is assumed to be true." This means that
having no graph is the same as having >
c
. Hence, by inserting this concept
into each empty context (rule 1), the usual translation process will take care of
the rest. Finally, to prevent  from generating incompatible formulas for graphs
in the same context, the quantier prex of each graph must be moved to the
front of the whole formula (rule 9).
Having xed 's denition, let us extend it to handle higher-order types. In
the new framework, types can be used as markers, and therefore there is also a
partial order over markers. Furthermore, higher-order graphs are mainly used for
meta-level statements. This means that the interpretation of coreference links
should be slightly dierent. Consider the graph
g = SHAPE: #rhombus    SHAPE: #rectangle
If the markers represent single individuals, and therefore SHAPE is a rst-order
type, g states that \a rhombus is the same shape as a rectangle". In logic, the
equivalent statement is
Shape(rhombus) ^ rhombus
:
= rectangle ^ Shape(rectangle) (1)
However, if one considers RHOMBUS and RECTANGLE to be rst-order types, and
SHAPE to be second-order, then the intuitive reading should be \there is a shape
which is both a rhombus and a rectangle". The new translation should be
9x Shape(x) ^ x v rhombus ^ x v rectangle (2)
4
This is the inx form of :
:
= (x;x) because only predicates can be negated, not
variables.
where v is a special predicate (written as an inx operator) denoting the partial
order among markers. Notice that formula 1 is false, but 2 is true since x can be
substituted by SQUARE.
However, the translation generated by  won't be exactly as formula 2. Let
us see why. Both relation types and non-relational concept types can appear to
the left or to the right of `:' in a concept. In other words, most types can be used
as markers too. This means that they can be translated as predicates or con-
stants. For example, ( CAT: #Garfield ) = Cat(gareld) but ( SPECIES: #cat ) =
Species(cat) where Cat and cat are dierent logical symbols. With the purpose
of using as few symbols as possible, the form Holds(cat ; gareld) will be used
instead of Cat(gareld ). The \meta-predicate" Holds (similar to the one used
in the KIF language [Genesereth and Fikes, 1992]) can also be applied to re-
lations. For example, Agnt(x; y) will be written as Holds(agnt ; x; y). Formally,
as each predicate must have a xed arity, there is not a single Holds but a set
fHolds
i
ji > 0g where i is the arity of the relation type that appears as the rst
argument of the predicate. Concept types can be seen as unary relation types
and therefore t : m won't be translated to T (m) anymore but to Holds
1
(t;m)
instead (rule 6). Similarly the atomic formula R(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) will be rewritten as
Holds
n
(r; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) (rule 7). The predicate Holds
i
has therefore arity i + 1.
The utilization of Holds
i
makes the logical vocabulary even smaller, since
v becomes unnecessary. In fact, if m and m
0
are types, m v m
0
can be re-
stated as 8x Holds(m;x) ! Holds(m
0
; x) which in turn can be written as
:9x Holds
1
(m;x) ^ :Holds
1
(m
0
; x) (rule 6). Otherwise, i.e. if m and m
0
are
individuals, m v m
0
is simply the same as m
:
= m
0
(rule 6), because neither m
nor m
0
have any subtypes.
Notice that relational concept types can't appear in the referent eld of
concepts. Therefore, they can't be translated to logical constants and as such
can't be quantied over or appear as arguments of some Holds
i
. This means that
t : m will generate t(m) when t is a relational concept type.
Denition1. The translation of conceptual graphs to rst-order logic is done
according to the rules that follow. The functions , 
p
, 
b
return for each con-
ceptual graph a sequence of logical symbols. The sequence (g) is the rst-order
formula for graph g, and it consists of the quantier prex 
p
(g) and the body

b
(g). For each concept c, the auxiliary functions id , cl , and dom return, re-
spectively, a variable that uniquely identies c, a boolean that indicates if c is
attached to a coreference link, and the set of identiers of the concepts that dom-
inate c. When necessary, the operator  explicity represents the concatenation
of symbol sequences.
1. In each empty context of g insert a concept >
c
: * .
2. For each concept c let id(c) = x, where x is a unique variable.
3. For each concept c let cl(c) = true if c is attached to some coreference link,
otherwise cl(c) = false.
4. For each concept c let dom(c) = fid(c
0
)jc
0
dominates cg.
5. For each concept c let 
p
(c) = 9id(c).
6. For each concept c with type(c) = t and referent(c) = m, the formula 
b
(c)
is obtained by the conjuntion of all the following sub-formulas that apply:
{ :id(c)
:
= id(c) if t = ?
c
or m =

*;
{ id(c)
:
= id (c) if t = >
c
;
{ t(id(c)) if t 2 T
rc
;
{ Holds
1
(t; id(c)) otherwise;
{
^
x2dom(c)
id(c)
:
= x;
{ m
:
= id (c) if m 2 T
nc
0
or cl(c) = false and m 62 f*;

*g;
{ (:9x Holds
1
(id(c); x) ^ :Holds
1
(m;x)), where x 6= id(c), if m 62 T
nc
0
[
f*;

*g and cl(c) = true.
7. Let r be a relation with concepts c
1
; : : : ; c
n
as arguments. If type(r) = >
r
or type(r) = ?
r
then 
b
(r) = id(c
1
)
:
= id(c
1
) or 
b
(r) = :id(c
1
)
:
= id(c
1
),
respectively. Otherwise 
b
(r) = Holds
n
(type(r); id(c
1
); : : : ; id(c
n
)).
8. If g is a conceptual graph without contexts and with concepts C and relations
R, then (g) = 
p
(g)
b
(g) where

p
(g) =
K
c2C

p
(c) 
b
(g) =
^
c2C

b
(c) ^
^
r2R

b
(r)
9. If p is a proposition containing the set of graphs G then 
p
(p) is the empty
sequence and (p) = 
b
(p) = (
K
g2G

p
(g)
^
g2G

b
(g)).
10. If c is a context formed by the negation of proposition p, then 
p
(c) is the
empty sequence and (c) = 
b
(c) = :(p).
Several translation examples follow. They show the dierence between the
old and the new denition of , and illustrate how some previously problematic
cases are now handled. Table 2 gives further examples.
Example 4. The translation of CAT: #Garfield  




AGNT  CHASE !




OBJ! DOG
is
9x9y Cat(gareld ) ^ Chase(x) ^Dog(y) ^Agnt(x; gareld) ^Obj (x; y)
according to Assumption 3.3.2. Applying Denition 1 instead, one has
9x9y9z Holds
1
(cat ; z) ^ z
:
= gareld ^Holds
1
(chase ; x)^Holds
1
(dog ; y)^
Holds
2
(agnt ; x; z) ^Holds
2
(obj ; x; y)
Example 5. The formula 8x P(x) states basically that \if x is some entity then
P (x) is true". Let P be any relational type
5
. Then
(
:
>
c
  
:
   P ) = :(9x x
:
= x ^ :(9y P (y) ^ y
:
= x))
5
The result would be similar if P were a non-relational type. Just substitute
Holds
1
(p; x) for P (x).
This formula is equivalent to 8x x
:
= x! 9y P (y)^y
:
= x. Due to the properties
of equality, x
:
= x is always true and P (y) ^ y
:
= x corresponds to P (x). Thus
one gets 8x P (x) as expected.
Example 6. According to the formulation of rule 9, the graph
:
CAT       DOG
shown before is correctly translated as
9x :(9y Holds
1
(cat ; y) ^ y = x) ^Holds
1
(dog ; x)
Example 7. The graph SHAPE: #rectangle    SHAPE: #rhombus has a coreference link
between higher-order concepts. The corresponding formula is therefore
9x9y Holds
1
(shape; x) ^ x
:
= y ^ (:9z Holds
1
(x; z) ^ :Holds
1
(rectangle; z))^
Holds
1
(shape; y) ^ y
:
= x ^ (:9z Holds
1
(y; z) ^ :Holds
1
(rhombus ; z))
Example 8. The coreference link in PERSON: Rosalie   
:
   PERSON: Rosann con-
nects two rst-order concepts. Applying rule 6 in this case leads to
9xHolds
1
(person ; x)^x
:
= rosalie^:(9y Holds
1
(person; y)^y
:
= rosann^y
:
= x)
The  operator just translates a sequence of symbols of some language (Con-
ceptual Graphs) into another sequence of symbols (called formula) of some other
language (rst-order logic). For this process to have any meaning, the resulting
formulas must have an interpretation. Classically, an interpretation of a rst-
order language L is a pair hD; i where the denotation function  maps con-
stants of L into elements of the domainD and predicates into tuples of elements
of D. The new denition of interpretation [Wermelinger, 1995] just adds the
constraints presented informally in Section 2.
4 Inference
Theoretically, the translation and interpretation of conceptual graphs is impor-
tant to show the formalism's expressiveness. But the main goal is to have infer-
ence rules that operate directly on conceptual graphs, instead of translating the
graphs to formulas, do the proofs with them and then translating back to the
graphical form.
The proof system given in [Sowa, 1984] consists of a single axiom, the empty
set of graphs, and several rst-order rules of inference. These are mainly based
on the depth of a graph, i.e. on how many negative contexts one must traverse
to reach the graph starting from the outer context. Depending on the depth, the
graph is said to be in an evenly enclosed or oddly enclosed context. Even contexts
contain true graphs and odd contexts contain false graphs. Therefore, conditions
(i.e, graphs and coreference links) can be removed from the former and added
to the latter. Moreover, a context c dominating a context c
0
(that is, c
0
= c or
c
0
is enclosed in a context dominated by c) corresponds to an implication and
therefore the graphs in c (the antecedent) can be copied to c
0
(the consequent).
As simple and elegant it is, Sowa's system must be changed, even if one
considers the corrected version of  and no higher-order types. In fact, there
are now several ways of representing truth, and each true graph that can't be
derived from others must be an axiom. Otherwise the system won't be com-
plete. Moreover, a new rule must be added: axioms may be inserted and re-
moved from any context. Without these changes the universal instantion rule
can't be applied to conceptual graphs. Using the old notation for clarity, con-
sider the example 8x Cat(x) ` Cat(gareld). In graphical form the hypothesis
is
:
>
c
  
:
   CAT . Restricting the referent in the oddly enclosed context one
gets
:
>
c
: #Garfield   
:
   CAT . By the individuation rule, a individual marker
can be iterated from a dominating concept to a dominated one
6
and the corefer-
ence link may be erased, provided the dominated concept is generic. We thus get
:
>
c
: #Garfield
:
CAT: #Garfield but can't proceed any further because graphs
can't be removed from odd contexts.
The remaining of this section presents therefore a new formal proof system.
For the most part it is similar to Sowa's. The changes that were done (including
the above mentioned) are due to the type and marker hierarchies, the new in-
terpretation of universal and absurd types, and the new meaning of coreference
links resulting from the use of higher-order types.
In [Sowa, 1984] only concept types formed a hierarchy. Relation types and
markers were incomparable. Therefore, the inference rules only enabled one to
restrict concept types, i.e. to substitute them by subtypes, and to replace the
generic marker by an individual marker, or the other way round. In this frame-
work, relation types and markers may also be (un)restricted but there are some
limitations. Let t and t
0
be any concept or relation types, such that t is a sub-
type of t
0
. Therefore, if Holds
n
(t; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) is true, then Holds
n
(t
0
; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
is also true, and if the latter is false, so is the former. Thus any type may be
unrestricted in evenly enclosed contexts and it may be substituted by a subtype
in oddly enclosed contexts. In this respect higher-order types don't change the
original inference rules.
However, markers can't be changed at will. Consider Examples 1 and 3:
CAT is a subtype of FELINE which is a GENUS while CAT is a SPECIES. If the
graph SPECIES: #cat is in an evenly enclosed context it is true, but it can't
be generalized to the false graph SPECIES: #feline . Similarly, if the latter is in
an oddly enclosed context, it can't be specialized to the former. To sum up,
individual markers can't be (un)restricted to other individual markers but they
can be transformed into the generic or absurd markers. For example, the true
graph
:
SPECIES: #feline can be specialized to the equally true
:
SPECIES:

* .
There is however one case where the marker hierarchy can be put to use,
6
A concept c
1
dominates a concept c
2
if there is a coreference link between them and
the context of c
1
dominates the context of c
2
.
Context of c Coreference link? m Action
even no

* unrestrict
even no 6=

* unrestrict to *
even yes any unrestrict
odd no * restrict
odd no 6=* restrict to

*
odd yes any restrict
Table 1. Conditions for changing referent m of concept c
namely if a coreference link is present. Let m be the marker of some dominating
or dominated concept c whose identier is the variable x. If m is a type, the
condition x v m belongs to the context of c. If that context is even, the condition
is true and so is x v m
0
where m
0
is a supertype of m. If the context is odd, the
condition is false and restricting m to some subtype doesn't make it true. Table
1 summarizes all these conditions.
There is one more situation where markers can be restricted. Consider a
concept c
1
, with marker m
1
and identier x
1
, dominating a concept c
2
with
referent m
2
and associated variable x
2
. Then, the condition x
2
:
= x
1
enables one
to iterate any condition on x
1
from c
1
's context to c
2
's context. This corresponds
to the replacement of m
2
by m
12
, the greatest lower bound of m
1
and m
2
: if
x
1
v m
1
and x
2
v m
2
then x
2
v m
12
7
(assuming x
2
:
= x
1
). Notice however
that the restriction on m
2
can only be done if the result isn't the absurd marker,
because a false graph might be obtained if c
2
is evenly enclosed. If c
2
were oddly
enclosed the last line of Table 1 would apply and therefore this new rule, which
nds an upper limit for the value x
2
that satises the formula, wouldn't be
needed.
As for logical axioms, Sowa only uses the empty set of graphs. As seen in
the previous section, some predicate true(x) is needed in order to be able to
represent all closed formulas of rst-order logic. That predicate turned out to
be the equality
:
=. Therefore, the new axioms are graphs whose translation is
some tautology based on x
:
= x. Looking at Denition 1 the possibilities listed
in Table 2 are obtained, where m and m
0
are any markers dierent from

* and
t; t
0
are any concept types (although the given translations assume that they are
non-relational).
It is obvious that the graphs involving >
r
and ?
r
may have any arity. How-
ever, there is a subtle dierence. The mere presence of the absurd type ?
r
au-
tomatically makes the graph false, and therefore the axiom true. The concepts
used as relation arguments are thus irrelevant. But the same does not happen
with the universal type >
r
. The concepts to which it is linked must be true too
for the whole graph to be true. It is also worth noticing that  translates the
empty context in the same way as >
c
. The rules of inference will of course
7
See Example 9.
( ) = 9x x
:
= x
( >
c
: m ) = 9x x
:
= x ^ x
:
= m
(
:
?
c
: m ) = :9x :x
:
= x ^ x
:
= m
(
:
t:

* ) = :9x Holds
1
(t; x) ^ :x
:
= x
(
:




?
r
! t : m ) = :9x :x
:
= x ^Holds
1
(t; x) ^ x
:
= m
(
:
t : m !




?
r
! t
0
: m
0
) = :9x9y :x
:
= x ^ Holds
1
(t; x) ^ x
:
= m ^
Holds
1
(t
0
; y) ^ y
:
=m
0
(




>
r
! >
c
: m ) = 9x x
:
= x ^ x
:
= x ^ x
:
= m
( >
c
: m !




>
r
! >
c
: m
0
) = 9x9y x
:
= x^x
:
= x^x
:
= m^y
:
= y^y
:
=m
0
Table 2. Logical axioms
allow one to insert and erase logical axioms from any context. The empty con-
text becomes therefore obsolete because it can be derived from any other axiom
by erasure. However, it will be kept for convenience. There are other redundant
graphs in the above table. For example, any
:
?
c
: m can be obtained from
:
?
c
: * by restricting the referent (see the fourth line of Table 1). In the same
way,
:




?
r
! t : m can be derived from
:




?
r
! >
c
: * . The nal set of logical
axioms can be found in Denition 2.
Finally, the rules for handling coreference links are basically the same as in
[Sowa, 1984] when the dominated concept is rst-order. Otherwise a coreference
link can't be inserted or removed in the general case. Let us see why. Consider
again concepts c
1
and c
2
mentioned before. When a coreference link is drawn
the following happens:
1. The condition x
2
:
= x
1
is added to the context of c
2
.
2. The condition x
2
= m
2
becomes x
2
v m
2
if m
2
62 T
nc
0
[ f*;

*g.
3. The condition x
1
= m
1
becomes x
1
v m
1
if m
1
62 T
nc
0
[ f*;

*g.
The erasure of a coreference link consists in doing the opposite actions. Due
to step 1, coreference links can't be inserted when c
2
is evenly enclosed, and
they can't be removed if c
2
is in an odd context. Additionally, if c
2
is a higher-
order concept, step 2 applies. In this case inserting a coreference link relaxes the
condition (i.e., it could become true), and therefore c
2
can't be oddly enclosed.
Inversely, erasing a coreference link makes the condition stronger (x
2
v m
2
Context of c
1
Context of c
2
m
1
2 T
nc
0
[ f*;

*g m
2
2 T
nc
0
[ f*;

*g Action
any even yes yes erasure
any odd yes yes insertion
odd even no yes erasure
even odd no yes insertion
odd even no no erasure if m
1
=m
2
even odd no no insertion if m
1
= m
2
Table 3. Conditions for changing coreference links
becomes x
2
= m
2
) which prevents c
2
from being evenly enclosed
8
. Steps 1 and
2 thus impose contradictory restrictions on the context of c
2
.
Fortunately, there is an exception, namely if m
1
= m
2
. Consider the case
where c
2
is evenly enclosed and the coreference link has therefore been removed.
The new conditions are x
2
:
= m
2
and x
1
:
= m
1
. Due to our assumption, the
conditions are equivalent and therefore the erasure corresponds to the iteration of
a condition from the dominating to the dominated context. The other possibility
is to insert a coreference link if c
2
is oddly enclosed. The new conditions are
x
1
v m
1
in c
1
's context and x
2
v m
2
^ x
2
:
= x
1
for c
2
. Again, due to their
equivalence, insertion of a coreference link corresponds to an iteration.
Table 3 summarizes the preceding observations. No action is possible for
the unlisted cases. It should be obvious that it is not necessary to check any
restrictions if the coreference link to be inserted or removed is an exact copy of
another existing one. Also, since coreference links represent equalities, they may
be inserted or removed according to the transitivity rule.
The inference rules can at last be presented.
Denition2. Let S be a set of conceptual graphs in the outer context. Any
graph derived from S by the following rst-order rules of inference is said to be
provable from S.
Equivalence In any context, a logical axiom may be inserted or removed, a
double negation may be drawn or erased around any set of graphs.
Generalization In an evenly enclosed context, any type or marker may be
unrestricted, and any graph or coreference link may be deleted, as long as
the conditions in Tables 1 and 3 are obeyed.
Specialization In an oddly enclosed context, any type or marker may be re-
stricted, and any graph or coreference link may be inserted, as long as the
conditions in Tables 1 and 3 are obeyed.
Iteration A graph may be copied from context c to any context dominated by
c, and coreference links may be drawn between the original concepts and
their copies.
Deiteration The result of some possible iteration may be deleted.
8
The same reasoning applies to c
1
if it isn't a rst-order concept.
Transitivity If concept c
1
dominates concept c
2
which in turn dominates c
3
6=
c
1
, then a coreference link between c
1
and c
3
may be drawn or erased. If it
is inserted, then the coreference link between c
2
and c
3
may be erased.
Individuation If concept c
1
dominates concept c
2
then referent(c
2
) may be
replaced by the greatest lower bound of referent(c
1
) and referent(c
2
) if the
result is dierent than

*.
A graph provable from the following logical axioms is called a theorem.
{ The empty set of graphs fg;
{ >
c
: m for any m 2 M  f

*g;
{
:
?
c
: * ;
{
:
>
c
:

* ;
{
:




?
r
! >
c
: * and for any other arity;
{




>
r
! >
c
: m for any m 2M  f

*g and any arity.
Example 9. Applying the individuation rule twice, and considering Exam-
ple 2, the graph SHAPE: #rectangle    SHAPE: #rhombus is rst transformed to
SHAPE: #rectangle    SHAPE: #square and then SHAPE: #square    SHAPE: #square is
derived. Notice that this graph doesn't necessarily imply SHAPE: #square because
the former states that there exists a subtype of SQUARE which is a shape while
the latter states that SQUARE itself is a shape.
Example 10. The subtype relationships CAT < FELINE < ANIMAL can be stated
by the graph
:
CAT   
:
  
:
   FELINE   
:
   ANIMAL
Erasing the double negation (an equivalence rule), it can be simplied to
:
CAT    FELINE   
:
   ANIMAL
and applying the transitivity rule one gets
:
FELINE    CAT   
:
   ANIMAL
The rst graph corresponds indeed to the given type hierarchy fragment, as can
be easily seen by the translation of it:
:9x Holds
1
(cat ; x) ^ ::9y Holds
1
(feline; y) ^ y
:
= x^
:9z Holds
1
(animal ; z) ^ z
:
= y
or more simply
8x Holds
1
(cat ; x)! 8yHolds
1
(feline; y) ^ x
:
= y ! 9z Holds
1
(animal ; z) ^ z
:
= y
This formula is equivalent to
8x8y Holds
1
(cat ; x)^Holds
1
(feline; y) ^ x
:
= y ! 9z Holds
1
(animal ; z) ^ z
:
= y
which is the translation of the second graph. Obviously, it can be rewritten as
8x8y Holds
1
(cat ; x) ^Holds
1
(feline; y) ^ x
:
= y ! 9z Holds
1
(animal ; z) ^ z
:
= x
corresponding to the last graph.
5 Conclusions
This paper has provided a closer look at the logical foundations of Conceptual
Structures Theory. It was shown that the original formal denitions of [Sowa,
1984] are incomplete: on one hand, some closed rst-order formulas can't be
represented with conceptual graphs, on the other hand the universal instantiation
rule is missing. Therefore, the denitions of the  operator and of the rst-order
inference rules have been corrected. Furthermore, they have been extended to
handle higher-order types.
It is hoped that this paper provides a rst step towards a meta-level reasoning
engine and a deeper investigation of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic
properties of Conceptual Structures.
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